We went into Afghanistan because of 9/11. Why did the intelligence community fail to foresee or prevent it? From the report of the 9/11 commission:
Commenting on Pearl Harbor,Roberta Wohlstetter found it "much easier after the event to sort the relevant from the irrelevant signals.After the event,of course, a signal is always crystal clear; we can now see what disaster it was signaling since the disaster has occurred. But before the event it is obscure and pregnant with conflicting meanings. ...With that caution in mind,we asked ourselves,before we judged others,whether the insights that seem apparent now would really have been
meaningful at the time,given the limits of what people then could reasonably have known or done. We believe the 9/11 attacks revealed four kinds of failures in:
- imagination (see bin Laden memo)
- policy (see NBC report)
- capabilities (see Washington Post on translators)
- and management (see map of intelligence community)
QUESTION: My question, sir, is are you feeling troubled about your standing here today about perhaps facing a credibility gap with the American people?
PRESIDENT: No. I'm feeling pretty spirited -- pretty good about life. And I made the decision to come before you so I could explain the NIE. And I have said Iran is dangerous. And the NIE doesn't do anything to change my opinion about the danger Iran poses to the world. Quite the contrary. I'm using this NIE as an opportunity to continue to rally our colleagues and allies. The NIE makes it clear that the strategy we have used in the past is effective.
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