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During the semester, I shall post course material and students will comment on it. Students are also free to comment on any aspect of the presidency, either current or historical. There are only two major limitations: no coarse language, and no derogatory comments about people at the Claremont Colleges.

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Sunday, April 12, 2026

Foreign Policy and National Security I

Today, constitutional provisions and institutional stucture.

Wednesday, the "how" and "why" of policy. Read Office of the President, "National Security Strategy of the United States," November 2025, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf

Next week's simulations:
Congressional war powers (Article I, sec. 8)

  • To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations;
  • To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water;
  • To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years;
  • To provide and maintain a Navy;
  • To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces;

Presidential War Power  (Article II, sec. 2)

  •  The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States

Tipping the balance:

  • “Frequent war and constant apprehension, which require a state of as constant preparation, will infallibly produce [standing armies]. It is of the nature of war to increase the executive at the expense of the legislative authority.” -- Alexander Hamilton, Federalist 8.
  • "If the Union’s existence were constantly menaced, and if its great interests were continually interwoven with those of other powerful nations, one would see the prestige of the executive growing, because of what was expected from it and of what it did."-- Tocqueville, Democracy in America
  • Notable deployments -- most without a declaration of war (Edwards,479)
  • The Cold War, Korea, and Vietnam
  • War Powers Act (Edwards, 480-481)

The Constitution and Diplomacy:
  •  "He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls... Article II, sec. 2).
  • "[He] shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers" (Article II, sec. 3).
Treaties, Agreements, and Trade
Key jobs

Actual powers and duties depend in part on the president.


The roles of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Combatant Commands.

Today, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have no executive authority to command combatant forces. The issue of executive authority was clearly resolved by the Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act of 1986: "The Secretaries of the Military Departments shall assign all forces under their jurisdiction to unified and specified combatant commands to perform missions assigned to those commands..."; the chain of command "runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense; and from the Secretary of Defense to the commander of the combatant command."

Mini-Simulation on April 22

On Monday and Wednesday of next week (April 20 and 22), we will do mini-simulations about presidential decisions and foreign policy.  You will not have to write a paper, but each of you will prepare for a different role in each mini-simulation. 

See general description here.

The second simulation will be a threat to Taiwan.

Preparing for your role

Before this Wednesday's class, let me know if you have a preferred role in either or both simulations.  If more than one student wants the same role in the same simulation, I will choose by lot, using a random-number generator. If you do NOT want a particular role, also let me know.  Selection for the remaining roles will be by lot, but nobody will play the same role twice.

Roles:

  • The President
  • INSTRUCTOR PLAYS National Security Advisor — Facilitates the discussion and manages the clock; synthesizes options and guides the president toward a decision without pushing their own agenda.
  • Vice President — Political and constitutional backstop; advises on domestic public opinion and congressional dynamics around a war with China.
  • Secretary of State — Manages U.S. alliances (Japan, South Korea, Australia, Philippines) and diplomatic off-ramps; central voice on whether to negotiate or confront.
  • Secretary of Defense — Principal defense policy advisor; assesses the feasibility and risks of military options, from naval deployments to full intervention.
  • Secretary of the Treasury — Advises on economic consequences of war, including financial sanctions on China and the impact on global markets and U.S. debt held by Beijing.
  • Secretary of Energy — Addresses nuclear weapons policy and energy security, including disruption to global semiconductor and energy supply chains.
  • Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff — The highest-ranking member of the U.S. military; advises the president on specific military options and the corresponding risks, benefits, and implications. Assesses what a defense of Taiwan would actually require militarily.
  • Director of National Intelligence — Presents the intelligence picture: how certain is the attack, what are China's goals, how long could Taiwan hold out?
  • Attorney General — Gives the president advice and opinions on the legal aspects of policies under consideration, including the War Powers Resolution, the Taiwan Relations Act, and the legal basis for military action.
  • Secretary of Homeland Security — Addresses domestic risks: cyberattacks on U.S. infrastructure accompanying the Taiwan invasion, port security, and protection of the U.S. defense industrial base.
  • U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations — Outlines policy steps available to the United States at the UN and advises NSC participants on what the Security Council can and cannot do  — including the reality that China holds a veto.
  • Director of the CIA — Provides covert options and deep intelligence on Chinese leadership intentions, PLA capabilities, and Taiwan's political will to resist.
  • White House Chief of Staff — Manages the domestic political dimension: congressional authorization, public opinion, and the president's political survival.
  • U.S. Trade Representative — Advises on trade war escalation with China, tariffs, export controls on semiconductors, and the economic interdependence that complicates a military response.
  • NSC Indo-Pacific Coordinator — Specialist role focused on U.S. alliances in the region — whether Japan and South Korea will grant basing rights, and how AUKUS and the Quad factor in.
  • Secretary of Commerce — Addresses the TSMC/semiconductor crisis: Taiwan produces the majority of the world's advanced chips, and a Chinese takeover would be a strategic catastrophe.
  • Under Secretary of Defense for Policy — Provides the granular strategic options — from positioning carrier groups to a full Article 5-style commitment — and the second- and third-order consequences of each.


Mini-Simulation on April 20

On Monday and Wednesday of next week (April 20 and 22), we will do mini-simulations about presidential decisions and foreign policy. You will not have to write a paper, but each of you will prepare for a different role in each mini-simulation.

See general description here (click instructions, role & goals, and how-to video).

The first simulation will be a choice between multilateralism and unilateralism.   (Take another look at this Wednesday's reading, the National Security Strategy)

Preparing for your role

Before this Wednesday's class, let me know if you have a preferred role in either or both simulations.  If more than one student wants the same role in the same simulation, I will choose by lot, using a random-number generator. If you do NOT want a particular role, also let me know.  Selection for the remaining roles will be by lot, but nobody will play the same role twice.

Roles:

1. The President — Listens, probes, and ultimately decides which approach will define their administration's foreign policy. The key challenge for this student: synthesizing competing arguments and articulate a coherent doctrine, not just pick a side. 


Executive Branch — Core Foreign Policy Principals

2.INSTRUCTOR PLAYS THE National Security Advisor — Frames the debate, manages the discussion, and keeps the conversation anchored to the question of long-term U.S. interests rather than any single crisis. The institutional memory role.

3. Secretary of State — The natural voice for multilateralism: treaties, alliances, international institutions, and diplomacy are the State Department's entire reason for existing. Should make the case that U.S. legitimacy and leverage depend on working through coalitions.

4. Secretary of Defense — More ambivalent than most expect. The Pentagon values reliable allies (burden-sharing, basing rights, interoperability) but also chafes at coalition warfare's constraints. This role should articulate the military's nuanced view rather than defaulting to hawkishness.

5. Director of National Intelligence — Brings the intelligence community's perspective: unilateralism is sometimes necessary when sharing intelligence with allies would compromise sources and methods, but multilateral intelligence-sharing has also been indispensable (Five Eyes, etc.).

6. Secretary of the Treasury — Makes the economic case: dollar hegemony, sanctions coalitions, trade agreements, and the IMF/World Bank system all depend on multilateral legitimacy. Unilateral sanctions are less effective when allies don't participate.

7. U.S. Trade Representative — Focuses on trade architecture specifically: are bilateral deals (a more unilateral approach) or multilateral frameworks like the WTO better for American interests? Connects foreign policy doctrine to economic policy in a way other roles don't.


Executive Branch — Domestic Institutional Voices

8. White House Chief of Staff — The political realist in the room. What will the American public support? What can survive Congress? Unilateralism often polls better domestically; multilateralism is harder to sell when it requires sharing credit or accepting constraints.

9. Attorney General — Addresses the legal architecture: international treaties and multilateral commitments are binding law under the Supremacy Clause; unilateralism can mean acting outside treaty frameworks, which raises constitutional questions the president must weigh.

10. Director of the Office of Management and Budget — Makes the fiscal argument: multilateral burden-sharing reduces the cost of global leadership. Unilateralism means the U.S. pays the full bill. In an era of deficit pressure, this is not a trivial point.


Congressional Voices 

11. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chair (president's party) — Reminds the president that multilateral treaties require Senate ratification (two-thirds), while executive agreements do not. The choice of doctrine has direct implications for what the president can do without Congress.

12. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Ranking Member (opposition party) — Likely to argue the opposite of whatever the chair argues, surfacing the partisan dimension of the multilateralism debate that has defined American foreign policy since Wilson.

13. House Armed Services Committee Chair — Focuses on the defense authorization and appropriations implications: multilateral operations require different force structures and funding than unilateral power projection.


Outside Perspectives (advisors invited to the meeting)

14. NATO Supreme Allied Commander (SACEUR) — The military's multilateralist par excellence. Makes the case that alliance interoperability, Article 5 credibility, and forward basing are irreplaceable assets that only multilateralism can sustain.

15. U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations — Argues for the UN system's value while acknowledging its frustrations (Security Council vetoes, etc.). The role that best captures why multilateralism is both necessary and maddening.

16. National Economic Council Director — Brings the domestic economy into the debate: global supply chains, foreign investment, and dollar dominance all depend on the rules-based international order that multilateralism built and sustains.

17. Historian/Senior Scholar (Council on Foreign Relations or similar) — A distinctive role that fits a CMC presidency course especially well: this student draws on the full semester's readings — Washington's Farewell Address, the Monroe Doctrine, TR vs. Wilson, FDR — to contextualize the choice historically. What have past presidents actually chosen, and what were the consequences?

18. American Public Advocate (domestic political advisor) — Represents public opinion and electoral politics. Polls consistently show Americans want burden-sharing but resist international constraints on sovereignty. This role forces the room to confront the gap between elite multilateralist consensus and the public's more ambivalent instincts — one of the central tensions the course explores when asking what it takes to win and keep the presidency. t


Tuesday, April 7, 2026

President, Judiciary, Civil Rights

Questions on the paper?

For Monday, Edwards ch. 14.  In-class sims the following week

Write-up question: Suppose Justice Alito retires next week.  Drawing on Edwards, speculate on what happens next.

Today, no in-person student hour but available for Zoom after 2 pm  and tomorrow between 10 and 3. Please email me first.

Recent SCOTUS nominations

The Alito story and the Federalist Society pipeline.

Nuclear option:  Dems in 2013 with executive and lower-court noms.  Reps in 2017 with SCOTUS.  Trump nominates Gorsuch.

Why is Kavanaugh hearing more contentious?  Probably helps GOP hold the Senate in 2018.

RBG dies, Trump nominates ACB. McConnell takes a different approach.

Other means of influence

  • Solicitor general
  • Encourage outside groups to file amicus briefs
  • Legislation and constitutional amendments
  • Public criticism
Pardon Power (Edwards 431-433).
Presidents and civil rights


Sunday, April 5, 2026

President and Judiciary

For Wed (abbreviated class)  continue with Ch. 12.

Questions on the paper?

Remainder of course?  Additional topics?


Eisenhower 1953-54    Unified  
Eisenhower 1955-60    Divided
JFK & LBJ                     Unified 
Nixon & Ford                 Divided     
Carter                              Unified
Reagan   1981-86           Divided: D House, R Senate
Reagan   1987-88          Divided
Bush 41                            Divided
Clinton  1993-94           Unified
Clinton  1995-2000       Divided
Bush 43  2001                Unified (Jeffords switch flipped Senate)
Bush 43  2001-02          Divided R House D Senate
Bush 43  2003-06         Unified
Bush  43  2007-08        Divided
Obama  2009-10           Unified
Obama  2011-14            Divided  R House D Senate
Obama  2015-16            Divided
Trump 2017-18              Unified
Trump 2019-20             Divided   D House R Senate
Biden   2021-22             Unified
Biden   2023 -24            Divided   R House, D Senate
Trump  2025-2026       Unified  


Relates to SCOTUS votes...

Today focus on judicial nominations, on Wed, more on other aspects of the presidency, judiciary, and civil rights.  

The Appointments Clause

WHERE YOU STAND DEPENDS ON WHERE YOU SIT.




    Nine justices

    179 appellate judges


    670+ district judges





What is senatorial courtesy? (Edwards 403-404)

Significance of US Courts of Appeal -- presidential success rate choosing

SCOTUS controversy has waxed and waned (Edwards 409-416)

FDR and court-packing (recall from Feb. 9)

Senate confirms Earl Warren by voice vote!

Then a string of lopsided, unanimous, or votes.

Then -- worried that his enemy Nixon will become president -- Warren announces retirement, and LBJ proposes to elevate Fortas.  Filibuster derails him.

  • Election year
  • Cronyism
  • Ethics

Senate confirms Warren Burger for chief, rejects two nominees for associate justice.  Nixon settles on Harry Blackmun.

Not a great deal of ideological vetting

Bork and Borking (start at 1:10):

Bush 41, Thomas, and "high-tech lynching." Start around 2:00

THOMAS WON CONFIRMATION IN A DEMOCRATIC-MAJORITY SENATE!  Democrats could have filibustered but, honoring tradition, did not.

Clinton nominees sail through, as does Roberts.  But Alito is more obviously partisan, and the questions focus on abortion.  Listen carefully to how he answers questions from pro-choice Republican Arlen Specter (who switches parties years later):


In 2016, Biden nominates but Senate GOP majority refuses to consider.

Nuclear option (above):  Dems in 2013 with executive and lower-court noms.  Reps in 2017 with SCOTUS.  Trump nominates Gorsuch.

Why is Kavanaugh hearing more contentious?  Probably helps GOP hold the Senate in 2018.

RBG dies, Trump nominates ACB







Tuesday, March 31, 2026

Presidency and Congress II (A Lot of Lyndon)

 For Monday, read Edwards ch. 12.  (slightly abbreviated class on Wed.)

What is a mandate  (Edwards 377-378)

Coattails work when POTUS helps pull party members over the finish line:  1932, 1964, 1980.    But there are very few marginal members anymore.  

And a problem for bipartisan outreach. Reagan passed his program with help from Southern Democrats in Reagan districts. But there are few split districts or states anymore:


The midterm slump (Edwards 371-373)

Pressuring copartisans:

FDR 1938 "purge" (start at 4:00) -- not very successful

Overt threats and retribution.

1. Republicans who lost primaries after opposing Trump U.S. House
MemberStateYearReason / Context
Liz CheneyWyoming2022Lost GOP primary after voting to impeach Trump and serving as vice-chair of the Jan. 6 committee.
Jaime Herrera BeutlerWashington2022Voted to impeach Trump; eliminated in the 2022 “jungle” primary amid pro-Trump challenges.
Tom RiceSouth Carolina2022Voted to impeach Trump; defeated by Trump-backed challenger Russell Fry.
Peter MeijerMichigan2022Voted to impeach Trump; defeated in GOP primary by Trump-backed John Gibbs.
Mark SanfordSouth Carolina2018Prominent Trump critic; lost primary to Trump-endorsed challenger Katie Arrington.
Bob GoodVirginia2024Initially backed Ron DeSantis instead of Trump in the presidential primary and lost to Trump-endorsed challenger John McGuire. 

2. Republicans who retired rather than run again amid conflict with Trump

U.S. House

MemberStateYearNotes
Adam KinzingerIllinois2022One of two Republicans on the Jan. 6 committee; chose not to seek reelection.
Anthony GonzalezOhio2022Voted to impeach Trump; announced retirement citing political toxicity and threats.
Fred UptonMichigan2022Impeachment vote; retired after intense pro-Trump backlash.
John KatkoNew York2022Impeachment vote; retired amid expected Trump-aligned primary challenge.
Paul RyanWisconsin2018As Speaker, clashed with Trump on several issues and chose to retire rather than seek reelection.

U.S. Senate

MemberStateYearNotes
Jeff FlakeArizona2018Frequent Trump critic; announced retirement saying the party was abandoning conservative principles.
Bob CorkerTennessee2018Openly clashed with Trump and retired rather than run again.
Ben SasseNebraska2022Long-time Trump critic; left the Senate to become president of the University of Florida.
Thom TillisNorth Carolina2026Announced retirement after conflict with Trump and backlash from MAGA activists. 


Bargainng

LBJ wants Rep. Wayne Hays (D-OH) to vote for a farm bill.  Hays wants the Department of Agriculture action on freight rates. 

Civil Rights

Why did LBJ want it?
The 1957 bill and "the long game"
  • Civil rights strategy
  • LBJ presidential strategy
Policy Window for 1964

Sunday, March 29, 2026

President and Congress I

 For Wednesday:

Today, the formal powers and institutional advantages.  On Wed, legsislative bargaining and case studies.

One big advantage:  one voice v.535 voices.

Information asymmetry (Edwards 360-361).




Article I powersBills and agenda-setting

Vetoes.  

1— Strongly Support Passage
2— Support Passage
3— Do not Object to Passage
4— No Position on Passage
5— Oppose
6— Strongly Oppose
7— Secretary’s Veto Threat (single and multiple agency)
8— Senior Advisor’s Veto Threat
9— Presidential Veto Threat (285-286) and other warnings.
Item Veto (287): Supreme Court struck it down in Clinton v. City of New York.


Parties and Congress (Edwards 362-75)








1. Republicans who lost primaries after opposing Trump U.S. House
MemberStateYearReason / Context
Liz CheneyWyoming2022Lost GOP primary after voting to impeach Trump and serving as vice-chair of the Jan. 6 committee.
Jaime Herrera BeutlerWashington2022Voted to impeach Trump; eliminated in the 2022 “jungle” primary amid pro-Trump challenges.
Tom RiceSouth Carolina2022Voted to impeach Trump; defeated by Trump-backed challenger Russell Fry.
Peter MeijerMichigan2022Voted to impeach Trump; defeated in GOP primary by Trump-backed John Gibbs.
Mark SanfordSouth Carolina2018Prominent Trump critic; lost primary to Trump-endorsed challenger Katie Arrington.
Bob GoodVirginia2024Initially backed Ron DeSantis instead of Trump in the presidential primary and lost to Trump-endorsed challenger John McGuire. 

2. Republicans who retired rather than run again amid conflict with Trump

U.S. House

MemberStateYearNotes
Adam KinzingerIllinois2022One of two Republicans on the Jan. 6 committee; chose not to seek reelection.
Anthony GonzalezOhio2022Voted to impeach Trump; announced retirement citing political toxicity and threats.
Fred UptonMichigan2022Impeachment vote; retired after intense pro-Trump backlash.
John KatkoNew York2022Impeachment vote; retired amid expected Trump-aligned primary challenge.
Paul RyanWisconsin2018As Speaker, clashed with Trump on several issues and chose to retire rather than seek reelection.

U.S. Senate

MemberStateYearNotes
Jeff FlakeArizona2018Frequent Trump critic; announced retirement saying the party was abandoning conservative principles.
Bob CorkerTennessee2018Openly clashed with Trump and retired rather than run again.
Ben SasseNebraska2022Long-time Trump critic; left the Senate to become president of the University of Florida.
Thom TillisNorth Carolina2026Announced retirement after conflict with Trump and backlash from MAGA activists.