Domestic Policy I: Surprise, Uncertainty, and Emergency

• Class will adjourn at 11:55
• Questions on paper?
• Please remember your last write-ups this week.
• Student experience surveys.
• Wednesday, fiscal policy
• Presidential safety

Presidential assassinations and attempts

Year	Person	Status at Time	Details
1835	Andrew Jackson	President	Richard Lawrence fired two pistols at close range — both misfired. Jackson beat him with his cane.
1865 ✝	Abraham Lincoln	President	Shot by John Wilkes Booth at Ford's Theatre; died the following morning.
1881 ✝	James Garfield	President	Shot by Charles Guiteau at a Washington train station; died 11 weeks later from infection.
1901 ✝	William McKinley	President	Shot by Leon Czolgosz at the Pan-American Exposition in Buffalo, NY; died 8 days later.  Led to permanent Secret Service protection
1912	Theodore Roosevelt	Candidate (Progressive)	Shot in the chest while campaigning. Folded papers and a metal glasses case in his pocket blunted the bullet's impact and he was not seriously hurt. John Schrank was arrested and spent the remainder of his life in mental hospitals.  Roosevelt delivered his speech before seeking treatment.
1933	Franklin D. Roosevelt	President-elect	Giuseppe Zangara fired five shots in Miami; FDR was unharmed but Chicago mayor Anton Cermak was killed.
1950	Harry Truman	President	Two Puerto Rican nationalists stormed Blair House; Griselio Torresola and a guard were killed in the gunfight.
1963 ✝	John F. Kennedy	President	Shot by Lee Harvey Oswald in Dallas; died shortly after.
1968 ✝	Robert F. Kennedy	Candidate (Democratic)	Kennedy was seeking the Democratic presidential nomination when he was killed at a Los Angeles hotel moments after giving his victory speech for winning the 1968 California primary. Sirhan Sirhan was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death, later commuted to life in prison. PBS
1972	George Wallace	Candidate (Democratic)	Wallace gave a campaign speech at the Laurel Shopping Center when 21-year-old Arthur Bremer shot him five times (start video around1:40), 9starincluding in the abdomen and chest, paralyzing him from the waist down.  Although Wallace went on to win the Maryland primary, the injuries effectively ended his presidential campaign.
1975	Gerald Ford	President	Two separate attempts within 17 days — Lynette "Squeaky" Fromme (Sept. 5, Sacramento) and Sara Jane Moore (Sept. 22, San Francisco). Both failed.
1981	Ronald Reagan	President	Shot by John Hinckley Jr. outside the Washington Hilton; survived after emergency surgery. Press secretary James Brady was severely wounded.
1994	Bill Clinton	President	Francisco Duran fired 29 rounds at the White House facade; Clinton was inside and unharmed.
2005	George W. Bush	President	Vladimir Arutyunian threw a live grenade at Bush during a speech in Tbilisi, Georgia — it failed to detonate.
Jul 2024 ✝	Donald Trump	Candidate (Republican)	Thomas Crooks fired from a nearby rooftop at a Butler, PA rally. Trump was grazed in the ear; one attendee, Corey Comperatore, was killed. Crooks was shot dead by Secret Service.
Sep 2024	Donald Trump	Candidate (Republican)	Ryan Wesley Routh hid for nearly 12 hours in shrubbery outside Trump International Golf Club in West Palm Beach with an SKS rifle. Spotted by Secret Service before Trump came into range; Routh fled and was captured. Sentenced to life in prison in February 2026.
Feb 2026	Donald Trump	President	Austin Tucker Martin, 21, drove into the Mar-a-Lago security perimeter with a gas can and shotgun. Shot and killed by Secret Service; Trump was in Washington at the time.
Apr 2026	Donald Trump	President	Gunshots were heard while Trump was attending the White House Correspondents' Dinner. The Secret Service evacuated Trump, Melania, Vice President JD Vance, and several Cabinet members. A suspect was apprehended at the scene.

The Line of Succession

The U.S. Constitution and the Presidential Succession Act of 1947 outline the presidential line of succession. The line of succession of cabinet officers is in the order of their agencies’ creation

1. Vice President
2. Speaker of the House
3. President Pro Tempore of the Senate
4. Secretary of State
5. Secretary of the Treasury
6. Secretary of Defense
7. Attorney General
8. Secretary of the Interior
9. Secretary of Agriculture
10. Secretary of Commerce
11. Secretary of Labor
12. Secretary of Health and Human Services
13. Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
14. Secretary of Transportation
15. Secretary of Energy
16. Secretary of Education
17. Secretary of Veterans Affairs
18. Secretary of Homeland Security

Historical examples of presidents dealing with domestic surprise and uncertainty.  But unlike foreign and military policy, domestic issues present the president with limited authority and competing power structures.  George H.W. Bush wrote in his diary: "There’s a story in one of the papers that I am more comfortable with foreign affairs, and that is absolutely true. Because I don’t like the deficiencies of the domestic, political scene. I hate the posturing on both sides."

Bush and Katrina -- Brownie, you're doing a heckuva job and a contrarian view

Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee:

• "Predictable Surprise": The storm's severity and the failure of levees were foreseen, yet officials remained complacent in preparation.
• Systemic Failure: The disaster was not limited to one agency, but a failure of local, state, and federal leadership to adequately execute response plans.
• Failure of Initiative: Officials failed to take charge, often waiting for directions, which rendered first responders overwhelmed and ineffective.
• Communications and Command Breakdown: Widespread loss of communication infrastructure and lack of clear command structures hampered coordination

COVID (Edwards 443-444) -- most policy responses were at the state and local level.

Trump COVID-19 response timeline (2020)

Jan 3, 2020 Trump administration briefed on Wuhan outbreak

Jan 29, 2020 White House Coronavirus Task Force formed

Jan 31, 2020 Travel restrictions on China announced

Feb 2, 2020 "We pretty much shut it down coming in from China"

Feb 7, 2020 Woodward tape: "This is deadly stuff"

Woodward interview

Feb 26, 2020 "It's a little like the regular flu" — White House press conference, at 2:20

Feb 28, 2020 "This is their new hoax" — South Carolina rally

Mar 13, 2020 National emergency declared; $50 billion unlocked

Mar 18, 2020 Families First Coronavirus Response Act signed

Legislation

Mar 27, 2020 CARES Act signed — $2.2 trillion stimulus

Legislation

Apr 5, 2020 Woodward tape: Realization of severity — "When I saw how many were dying"

Apr 14, 2020 WHO funding halted pending review

May 15, 2020 Operation Warp Speed launched:  will spend $18 billion on parallel processing of vaccines.

Jun 20, 2020 Tulsa rally: Trump said he ordered testing slowdown

Jul 21, 2020 Woodward tape: "The virus has nothing to do with me"

Aug 23, 2020 Emergency authorization for convalescent plasma — amid controversy

Oct 2, 2020 Trump tests positive for COVID-19; hospitalized at Walter Reed

Dec 11–18, 2020 Pfizer and Moderna vaccines receive emergency authorization

Fog of War

 The Gulf of Tonkin

BULLETIN

 BREAKING NEWS — 11:32 AM PT

U.S. Indo-Pacific Command confirms that a U.S. Navy surveillance drone operating in international airspace approximately 70 miles east of Taiwan has been downed by an unidentified missile system.

Chinese state media claims the drone “violated Chinese sovereign airspace” and says the response was “defensive and appropriate.”

The Pentagon has not confirmed Chinese responsibility but states the incident is “under urgent review.”

 Taiwan’s Ministry of Defense reports increased PLA naval activity near the median line of the Taiwan Strait.

iNTELLIGENCE CABLE

 TOP SECRET // EYES ONLY — NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL BRIEFING

U.S. intelligence indicates significant divisions within Taiwan’s leadership.

• A senior faction within Taiwan’s ruling coalition is quietly advocating delayed resistance in the event of a Chinese blockade, fearing economic collapse.
• Opposition leaders are signaling openness to emergency negotiations with Beijing to avoid conflict.

Intercepts suggest Beijing is aware of these divisions and may accelerate pressure operations to exploit them.

POSSIBLE CYBER ATTACK

 GLOBAL MARKETS ALERT — 2:15 PM ET

Major semiconductor firms, including Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), report temporary shutdowns of key facilities due to cyber disruptions of industrial control systems.

The Dow has dropped 1,200 points. Tech stocks are down sharply.

U.S. manufacturers warn of immediate supply chain disruptions affecting defense systems, automobiles, and consumer electronics.

Cybersecurity analysts say the attack bears “hallmarks consistent with prior Chinese state-linked operations,” though attribution remains unconfirmed.

White House statement pending.

Crisis in the Taiwan Strait

 For Monday, read Edwards ch. 13.  For the weekly writeup, explain the most important thing you learned from this week's simulations.

On Monday, we shall adjourn a little early because of an Ath event.

The United States has been carefully monitoring the tense situation in the Taiwan Strait. Recent U.S. intelligence suggests that China is preparing for an invasion. Officials argue that the threat is so clear that the United States must either act now or risk not being able to prevent a forced Chinese takeover of Taiwan. The president has convened members of the National Security Council (NSC) for advice on whether and how to intervene.

NSC members should consider one of the following options:

• Do nothing, signaling to China that the United States will not intervene. Given the strength of the Chinese military, this option would likely result in China taking control of Taiwan. The United States could lose an important partner in the region. Moreover, U.S. allies could come to question America’s reliability and become strategically autonomous. As a result, China’s military reach and economic might could expand significantly. Chinese occupation of Taiwan would also see the collapse of a vibrant democracy. A successful invasion would force 24 million to live under the CCP’s rule. By opting not to intervene, however, the United States would avoid involvement in what could be a deadly and expensive military conflict.
• Impose economic and diplomatic sanctions on China. This option would isolate China on the world stage and stifle its economy. However, it is important for policymakers to note that such actions would have economic repercussions for the United States and China’s other trading partners as well. Such pressure could dissuade China from invading Taiwan and so avoid entangling U.S. forces in a conflict. China, however, could determine that any economic and diplomatic pain is worth it and invade Taiwan anyway.
• Position the U.S. military to defend Taiwan. This option would make it clear that the United States will defend Taiwan if China invades. The guarantee of U.S. involvement could dissuade China from attacking Taiwan. However, if China still goes forward with an invasion, the United States would find itself in a war with China.

Last Paper, Spring 2026

Choose one:

1. On Wednesday, you will undertake the Council on Foreign Relations mini-simulation “A Threat to Taiwan.” In that exercise, you have a specific role within the National Security Council or among outside advisers. In your essay, briefly explain how you performed your assigned role in the simulation, and then focus on how someone in that same role would likely act in the current administration if this crisis actually occurred. 

2. Edwards et al. finished writing the 19th edition of the textbook in 2024. Write an addendum to chapter 12, 13, or 14 explaining how events since 2024 have confirmed, disconfirmed, or complicated their analysis.

3. Write on a relevant topic of your choosing, subject to my approval and revision.

The specifications:

• Essays should be typed (12-point), double-spaced, and no more than three pages long. I will not read past the third page.
• Whichever option you choose, draw on course readings as well as outside research into primary and scholarly sources.
• Please submit all papers in this course as Word documents, not Google docs or pdfs.
• Read Strunk & White and my stylesheet (with links to model papers). Watch my writing lecture.
• Cite your sources. Please use endnotes in the format of the Chicago Manual of Style. Endnotes do not count against the page limit. Please do not use footnotes, which take up too much page space.
• Misrepresenting AI-generated content as your own work is plagiarism and will result in severe consequences
• Watch your spelling, grammar, diction, and punctuation. Errors will count against you.
• Return essays to the Canvas dropbox for this class by 11:59 PM, Wednesday, May 6. (If you have trouble with Canvas, simply email it to me as an attached file.) I reserve the right to dock papers one gradepoint for one day’s lateness, a full letter grade after that.

It Will Happen This Way...

 The roles:  who is playing what on which day.

Schedule for each simulation

Introduction by National Security Advisor (the instructor) and any opening remarks by POTUS

Round one (15-20 minutes): each participant makes a one-minute opening statement of initial position.  The president may ask questions.

Round two (20-30 minutes): Participants defend their recommendations and identify potential areas of compromise or disagreement. The National Security Advisor will call on students in the order in which they volunteer.

Round three  (15-20 minutes). The president starts by laying out 1–3 preferred options. The National Security Advisor then guides the discussion. After the airing of the policy options, POTUS should choose a policy option and may combine the strongest elements of several options. Remember, the NSC is not democratic and is an advisory, not decision-making, body. A vote is not necessary. The president does not need to choose the most popular option. 

Remaining time: debrief and reflection

==========================================

NAFTA, America not taken advantage of, 5%,alliances as multiplier,alliances and intelligence, influence over intl orgs, help consumers on oil prices,

For Monday, read the CFR summary and the article I emailed you.

For Wednesday, read the CFR summary and this article.  More to come.

Foreign Policy and National Security II

Next week's mini-simulations

For your writeup, briefly describe your roles and goals

What is strategy?  How does the NSS define goals?

What are tactics?

"Hard power" v. "Soft power"

Intelligence about intentions and capabilities

Sources of intelligence

JFK and the Cuban Missile Crisis

 Office of the President, "National Security Strategy of the United States," November 2025, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf

What did it say about Iran?

• America First: U.S. policy should stress concrete national interests over maintaining the global liberal order.
• Great-power competition: China is the primary long-term strategic rival; Russia remains a major security threat.
• Economic security = national security: Industrial capacity, energy production, technology leadership, and resilient supply chains are central to U.S. power.
• Western Hemisphere focus: The U.S. should limit Chinese and Russian influence in the Americas and strengthen regional dominance.
• Allies must do more: Partners—especially in Europe and Asia—are expected to carry greater defense burdens.

The Roles for Next week's Mini-Simulations

Here are the roles.  Read the background materials carefully and give some thought to how someone in your position would advise the president.Yes, you may swap roles, but let me know when you do.

APRIL 20

1. The President — Listens, probes, and ultimately decides which approach will define their administration's foreign policy. The key challenge for this student: synthesizing competing arguments and articulate a coherent doctrine, not just pick a side. RAE RUBEN

Executive Branch — Core Foreign Policy Principals

2.INSTRUCTOR PLAYS THE National Security Advisor — Frames the debate, manages the discussion, and keeps the conversation anchored to the question of long-term U.S. interests rather than any single crisis. The institutional memory role.

3. Secretary of State — The natural voice for multilateralism: treaties, alliances, international institutions, and diplomacy are the State Department's entire reason for existing. Should make the case that U.S. legitimacy and leverage depend on working through coalitions. IBUKUN OWOLABI

4. Secretary of Defense — More ambivalent than most expect. The Pentagon values reliable allies (burden-sharing, basing rights, interoperability) but also chafes at coalition warfare's constraints. This role should articulate the military's nuanced view rather than defaulting to hawkishness. PEILIN SWAN

5. Director of National Intelligence — Brings the intelligence community's perspective: unilateralism is sometimes necessary when sharing intelligence with allies would compromise sources and methods, but multilateral intelligence-sharing has also been indispensable (Five Eyes, etc.). GEORGIA ARNOLD

6. Secretary of the Treasury — Makes the economic case: dollar hegemony, sanctions coalitions, trade agreements, and the IMF/World Bank system all depend on multilateral legitimacy. Unilateral sanctions are less effective when allies don't participate. LUKE YOUNG

7. U.S. Trade Representative — Focuses on trade architecture specifically: are bilateral deals (a more unilateral approach) or multilateral frameworks like the WTO better for American interests? Connects foreign policy doctrine to economic policy in a way other roles don't. KIMBERLY RODRUGUEZ

Executive Branch — Domestic Institutional Voices

8. White House Chief of Staff — The political realist in the room. What will the American public support? What can survive Congress? Unilateralism often polls better domestically; multilateralism is harder to sell when it requires sharing credit or accepting constraints. CHLOE FONG

9. Attorney General — Addresses the legal architecture: international treaties and multilateral commitments are binding law under the Supremacy Clause; unilateralism can mean acting outside treaty frameworks, which raises constitutional questions the president must weigh. CLARE A'HEARN

10. Director of the Office of Management and Budget — Makes the fiscal argument: multilateral burden-sharing reduces the cost of global leadership. Unilateralism means the U.S. pays the full bill. In an era of deficit pressure, this is not a trivial point. SCOTT SLOOP

Congressional Voices 

11. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chair (president's party) — Reminds the president that multilateral treaties require Senate ratification (two-thirds), while executive agreements do not. The choice of doctrine has direct implications for what the president can do without Congress. HARRISON STECK

12. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Ranking Member (opposition party) — Likely to argue the opposite of whatever the chair argues, surfacing the partisan dimension of the multilateralism debate that has defined American foreign policy since Wilson. ZOE MUI

13. House Armed Services Committee Chair — Focuses on the defense authorization and appropriations implications: multilateral operations require different force structures and funding than unilateral power projection. CHRIS KAUFHOLD

Outside Perspectives (advisors invited to the meeting)

14. NATO Supreme Allied Commander (SACEUR) — The military's multilateralist par excellence. Makes the case that alliance interoperability, Article 5 credibility, and forward basing are irreplaceable assets that only multilateralism can sustain. STEPHANIE LI

15. U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations — Argues for the UN system's value while acknowledging its frustrations (Security Council vetoes, etc.). The role that best captures why multilateralism is both necessary and maddening. PETER CHEN    

16. National Economic Council Director — Brings the domestic economy into the debate: global supply chains, foreign investment, and dollar dominance all depend on the rules-based international order that multilateralism built and sustains. DYLAN GONZALEZ

17. Historian/Senior Scholar (Council on Foreign Relations or similar) — A distinctive role that fits a CMC presidency course especially well: this student draws on the full semester's readings — Washington's Farewell Address, the Monroe Doctrine, TR vs. Wilson, FDR — to contextualize the choice historically. What have past presidents actually chosen, and what were the consequences? 

RACHEL SVOYSKIY

18. American Public Advocate (domestic political advisor) — Represents public opinion and electoral politics. Polls consistently show Americans want burden-sharing but resist international constraints on sovereignty. This role forces the room to confront the gap between elite multilateralist consensus and the public's more ambivalent instincts — one of the central tensions the course explores when asking what it takes to win and keep the presidency JADEN ANDREWS

APRIL 22

The President  HARRISON STECK

INSTRUCTOR PLAYS National Security Advisor — Facilitates the discussion and manages the clock; synthesizes options and guides the president toward a decision without pushing their own agenda.

Vice President — Political and constitutional backstop; advises on domestic public opinion and congressional dynamics around a war with China. JADEN ANDREWS

Secretary of State — Manages U.S. alliances (Japan, South Korea, Australia, Philippines) and diplomatic off-ramps; central voice on whether to negotiate or confront. DYLAN GONZALEZ

Secretary of Defense — Principal defense policy advisor; assesses the feasibility and risks of military options, from naval deployments to full intervention. CHRIS KAUFHOLD

Secretary of the Treasury — Advises on economic consequences of war, including financial sanctions on China and the impact on global markets and U.S. debt held by Beijing. ZOE MUI   

Secretary of Energy — Addresses nuclear weapons policy and energy security, including disruption to global semiconductor and energy supply chains. CLARE A'HEARN

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff — The highest-ranking member of the U.S. military; advises the president on specific military options and the corresponding risks, benefits, and implications. Assesses what a defense of Taiwan would actually require militarily. SCOTT SLOOP

Director of National Intelligence — Presents the intelligence picture: how certain is the attack, what are China's goals, how long could Taiwan hold out?  IBUKUN OWOLABI

Attorney General — Gives the president advice and opinions on the legal aspects of policies under consideration, including the War Powers Resolution, the Taiwan Relations Act, and the legal basis for military action. CHLOE FONG

Secretary of Homeland Security — Addresses domestic risks: cyberattacks on U.S. infrastructure accompanying the Taiwan invasion, port security, and protection of the U.S. defense industrial base. GEORGIA ARNOLD

U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations — Outlines policy steps available to the United States at the UN and advises NSC participants on what the Security Council can and cannot do — including the reality that China holds a veto. PEILIN SWAN

Director of the CIA — Provides covert options and deep intelligence on Chinese leadership intentions, PLA capabilities, and Taiwan's political will to resist.  KIMBERLY RODRIGUEZ

White House Chief of Staff — Manages the domestic political dimension: congressional authorization, public opinion, and the president's political survival. STEPHANIE LI

U.S. Trade Representative — Advises on trade war escalation with China, tariffs, export controls on semiconductors, and the economic interdependence that complicates a military response. LUKE YOUNG

NSC Indo-Pacific Coordinator — Specialist role focused on U.S. alliances in the region — whether Japan and South Korea will grant basing rights, and how AUKUS and the Quad factor in. PETER CHEN

Secretary of Commerce — Addresses the TSMC/semiconductor crisis: Taiwan produces the majority of the world's advanced chips, and a Chinese takeover would be a strategic catastrophe. RAE RUBEN

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy — Provides the granular strategic options — from positioning carrier groups to a full Article 5-style commitment — and the second- and third-order consequences of each. RA CHEL SVOYSKIY

Foreign Policy and National Security I

Today, constitutional provisions and institutional structure.

Wednesday, the "how" and "why" of policy. Read Office of the President, "National Security Strategy of the United States," November 2025, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf

Next week's simulations:

• Multilateralism v. unilateralism
• Taiwan crisis

Congressional war powers (Article I, sec. 8)

• To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations;
• To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water;
• To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years;
• To provide and maintain a Navy;
• To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces;

Presidential War Power  (Article II, sec. 2)

•  The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States

Tipping the balance:

• “Frequent war and constant apprehension, which require a state of as constant preparation, will infallibly produce [standing armies]. It is of the nature of war to increase the executive at the expense of the legislative authority.” -- Alexander Hamilton, Federalist 8.
• "If the Union’s existence were constantly menaced, and if its great interests were continually interwoven with those of other powerful nations, one would see the prestige of the executive growing, because of what was expected from it and of what it did."-- Tocqueville, Democracy in America
• Notable deployments -- most without a declaration of war (Edwards,479)
• The Cold War, Korea, and Vietnam
• War Powers Act (Edwards, 480-481)

The Constitution and Diplomacy:

•  "He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls... Article II, sec. 2).
• "[He] shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers" (Article II, sec. 3).

Treaties, Agreements, and Trade

• Rejected treaties.
• Executive agreements
• Trade agreements

Key jobs

Actual powers and duties depend in part on the president.

The roles of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Combatant Commands.

Today, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have no executive authority to command combatant forces. The issue of executive authority was clearly resolved by the Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act of 1986: "The Secretaries of the Military Departments shall assign all forces under their jurisdiction to unified and specified combatant commands to perform missions assigned to those commands..."; the chain of command "runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense; and from the Secretary of Defense to the commander of the combatant command."

Mini-Simulation on April 22

On Monday and Wednesday of next week (April 20 and 22), we will do mini-simulations about presidential decisions and foreign policy.  You will not have to write a paper, but each of you will prepare for a different role in each mini-simulation. 

See general description here.

The second simulation will be a threat to Taiwan.

Preparing for your role

Before this Wednesday's class, let me know if you have a preferred role in either or both simulations.  If more than one student wants the same role in the same simulation, I will choose by lot, using a random-number generator. If you do NOT want a particular role, also let me know.  Selection for the remaining roles will be by lot, but nobody will play the same role twice.

Roles:

• The President
• INSTRUCTOR PLAYS National Security Advisor — Facilitates the discussion and manages the clock; synthesizes options and guides the president toward a decision without pushing their own agenda.
• Vice President — Political and constitutional backstop; advises on domestic public opinion and congressional dynamics around a war with China.
• Secretary of State — Manages U.S. alliances (Japan, South Korea, Australia, Philippines) and diplomatic off-ramps; central voice on whether to negotiate or confront.
• Secretary of Defense — Principal defense policy advisor; assesses the feasibility and risks of military options, from naval deployments to full intervention.
• Secretary of the Treasury — Advises on economic consequences of war, including financial sanctions on China and the impact on global markets and U.S. debt held by Beijing.
• Secretary of Energy — Addresses nuclear weapons policy and energy security, including disruption to global semiconductor and energy supply chains.
• Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff — The highest-ranking member of the U.S. military; advises the president on specific military options and the corresponding risks, benefits, and implications. Assesses what a defense of Taiwan would actually require militarily.
• Director of National Intelligence — Presents the intelligence picture: how certain is the attack, what are China's goals, how long could Taiwan hold out?
• Attorney General — Gives the president advice and opinions on the legal aspects of policies under consideration, including the War Powers Resolution, the Taiwan Relations Act, and the legal basis for military action.
• Secretary of Homeland Security — Addresses domestic risks: cyberattacks on U.S. infrastructure accompanying the Taiwan invasion, port security, and protection of the U.S. defense industrial base.
• U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations — Outlines policy steps available to the United States at the UN and advises NSC participants on what the Security Council can and cannot do  — including the reality that China holds a veto.
• Director of the CIA — Provides covert options and deep intelligence on Chinese leadership intentions, PLA capabilities, and Taiwan's political will to resist.
• White House Chief of Staff — Manages the domestic political dimension: congressional authorization, public opinion, and the president's political survival.
• U.S. Trade Representative — Advises on trade war escalation with China, tariffs, export controls on semiconductors, and the economic interdependence that complicates a military response.
• NSC Indo-Pacific Coordinator — Specialist role focused on U.S. alliances in the region — whether Japan and South Korea will grant basing rights, and how AUKUS and the Quad factor in.
• Secretary of Commerce — Addresses the TSMC/semiconductor crisis: Taiwan produces the majority of the world's advanced chips, and a Chinese takeover would be a strategic catastrophe.
• Under Secretary of Defense for Policy — Provides the granular strategic options — from positioning carrier groups to a full Article 5-style commitment — and the second- and third-order consequences of each.

Mini-Simulation on April 20

On Monday and Wednesday of next week (April 20 and 22), we will do mini-simulations about presidential decisions and foreign policy. You will not have to write a paper, but each of you will prepare for a different role in each mini-simulation.

See general description here (click instructions, role & goals, and how-to video).

The first simulation will be a choice between multilateralism and unilateralism.   (Take another look at this Wednesday's reading, the National Security Strategy)

Preparing for your role

Before this Wednesday's class, let me know if you have a preferred role in either or both simulations.  If more than one student wants the same role in the same simulation, I will choose by lot, using a random-number generator. If you do NOT want a particular role, also let me know.  Selection for the remaining roles will be by lot, but nobody will play the same role twice.

Roles:

1. The President — Listens, probes, and ultimately decides which approach will define their administration's foreign policy. The key challenge for this student: synthesizing competing arguments and articulate a coherent doctrine, not just pick a side. 

---

Executive Branch — Core Foreign Policy Principals

2.INSTRUCTOR PLAYS THE National Security Advisor — Frames the debate, manages the discussion, and keeps the conversation anchored to the question of long-term U.S. interests rather than any single crisis. The institutional memory role.

3. Secretary of State — The natural voice for multilateralism: treaties, alliances, international institutions, and diplomacy are the State Department's entire reason for existing. Should make the case that U.S. legitimacy and leverage depend on working through coalitions.

4. Secretary of Defense — More ambivalent than most expect. The Pentagon values reliable allies (burden-sharing, basing rights, interoperability) but also chafes at coalition warfare's constraints. This role should articulate the military's nuanced view rather than defaulting to hawkishness.

5. Director of National Intelligence — Brings the intelligence community's perspective: unilateralism is sometimes necessary when sharing intelligence with allies would compromise sources and methods, but multilateral intelligence-sharing has also been indispensable (Five Eyes, etc.).

6. Secretary of the Treasury — Makes the economic case: dollar hegemony, sanctions coalitions, trade agreements, and the IMF/World Bank system all depend on multilateral legitimacy. Unilateral sanctions are less effective when allies don't participate.

7. U.S. Trade Representative — Focuses on trade architecture specifically: are bilateral deals (a more unilateral approach) or multilateral frameworks like the WTO better for American interests? Connects foreign policy doctrine to economic policy in a way other roles don't.

---

Executive Branch — Domestic Institutional Voices

8. White House Chief of Staff — The political realist in the room. What will the American public support? What can survive Congress? Unilateralism often polls better domestically; multilateralism is harder to sell when it requires sharing credit or accepting constraints.

9. Attorney General — Addresses the legal architecture: international treaties and multilateral commitments are binding law under the Supremacy Clause; unilateralism can mean acting outside treaty frameworks, which raises constitutional questions the president must weigh.

10. Director of the Office of Management and Budget — Makes the fiscal argument: multilateral burden-sharing reduces the cost of global leadership. Unilateralism means the U.S. pays the full bill. In an era of deficit pressure, this is not a trivial point.

---

Congressional Voices 

11. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chair (president's party) — Reminds the president that multilateral treaties require Senate ratification (two-thirds), while executive agreements do not. The choice of doctrine has direct implications for what the president can do without Congress.

12. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Ranking Member (opposition party) — Likely to argue the opposite of whatever the chair argues, surfacing the partisan dimension of the multilateralism debate that has defined American foreign policy since Wilson.

13. House Armed Services Committee Chair — Focuses on the defense authorization and appropriations implications: multilateral operations require different force structures and funding than unilateral power projection.

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Outside Perspectives (advisors invited to the meeting)

14. NATO Supreme Allied Commander (SACEUR) — The military's multilateralist par excellence. Makes the case that alliance interoperability, Article 5 credibility, and forward basing are irreplaceable assets that only multilateralism can sustain.

15. U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations — Argues for the UN system's value while acknowledging its frustrations (Security Council vetoes, etc.). The role that best captures why multilateralism is both necessary and maddening.

16. National Economic Council Director — Brings the domestic economy into the debate: global supply chains, foreign investment, and dollar dominance all depend on the rules-based international order that multilateralism built and sustains.

17. Historian/Senior Scholar (Council on Foreign Relations or similar) — A distinctive role that fits a CMC presidency course especially well: this student draws on the full semester's readings — Washington's Farewell Address, the Monroe Doctrine, TR vs. Wilson, FDR — to contextualize the choice historically. What have past presidents actually chosen, and what were the consequences?

18. American Public Advocate (domestic political advisor) — Represents public opinion and electoral politics. Polls consistently show Americans want burden-sharing but resist international constraints on sovereignty. This role forces the room to confront the gap between elite multilateralist consensus and the public's more ambivalent instincts — one of the central tensions the course explores when asking what it takes to win and keep the presidency. t

President, Judiciary, Civil Rights

Questions on the paper?

For Monday, Edwards ch. 14.  In-class sims the following week

Write-up question: Suppose Justice Alito retires next week.  Drawing on Edwards, speculate on what happens next.

Today, no in-person student hour but available for Zoom after 2 pm  and tomorrow between 10 and 3. Please email me first.

Recent SCOTUS nominations

The Alito story and the Federalist Society pipeline.

Nuclear option:  Dems in 2013 with executive and lower-court noms.  Reps in 2017 with SCOTUS.  Trump nominates Gorsuch.

Why is Kavanaugh hearing more contentious?  Probably helps GOP hold the Senate in 2018.

RBG dies, Trump nominates ACB. McConnell takes a different approach.

Other means of influence

• Solicitor general
• Encourage outside groups to file amicus briefs
• Legislation and constitutional amendments
• Public criticism

Pardon Power (Edwards 431-433).

• Unchecked
• Biden family pardons
• Trump II

Presidents and civil rights

• Nixon and executive order on affirmative action
• Bush 41 and the Americans with Disabilities Act

President and Judiciary

For Wed (abbreviated class)  continue with Ch. 12.

Questions on the paper?

Remainder of course?  Additional topics?

Eisenhower 1953-54    Unified  

Eisenhower 1955-60    Divided

JFK & LBJ                     Unified 

Nixon & Ford                 Divided     

Carter                              Unified

Reagan   1981-86           Divided: D House, R Senate

Reagan   1987-88          Divided

Bush 41                            Divided

Clinton  1993-94           Unified

Clinton  1995-2000       Divided

Bush 43  2001                Unified (Jeffords switch flipped Senate)

Bush 43  2001-02          Divided R House D Senate

Bush 43  2003-06         Unified

Bush  43  2007-08        Divided

Obama  2009-10           Unified

Obama  2011-14            Divided  R House D Senate

Obama  2015-16            Divided

Trump 2017-18              Unified

Trump 2019-20             Divided   D House R Senate

Biden   2021-22             Unified

Biden   2023 -24            Divided   R House, D Senate

Trump  2025-2026       Unified  

Relates to SCOTUS votes...

Today focus on judicial nominations, on Wed, more on other aspects of the presidency, judiciary, and civil rights.  

The Appointments Clause

WHERE YOU STAND DEPENDS ON WHERE YOU SIT.

    Nine justices

    179 appellate judges

    670+ district judges

What is senatorial courtesy? (Edwards 403-404)

Significance of US Courts of Appeal -- presidential success rate choosing

SCOTUS controversy has waxed and waned (Edwards 409-416)

FDR and court-packing (recall from Feb. 9)

Senate confirms Earl Warren by voice vote!

Then a string of lopsided, unanimous, or votes.

Then -- worried that his enemy Nixon will become president -- Warren announces retirement, and LBJ proposes to elevate Fortas.  Filibuster derails him.

• Election year
• Cronyism
• Ethics

Senate confirms Warren Burger for chief, rejects two nominees for associate justice.  Nixon settles on Harry Blackmun.

Not a great deal of ideological vetting

Bork and Borking (start at 1:10):

Bush 41, Thomas, and "high-tech lynching." Start around 2:00

THOMAS WON CONFIRMATION IN A DEMOCRATIC-MAJORITY SENATE!  Democrats could have filibustered but, honoring tradition, did not.

Clinton nominees sail through, as does Roberts.  But Alito is more obviously partisan, and the questions focus on abortion.  Listen carefully to how he answers questions from pro-choice Republican Arlen Specter (who switches parties years later):

In 2016, Biden nominates but Senate GOP majority refuses to consider.

Nuclear option (above):  Dems in 2013 with executive and lower-court noms.  Reps in 2017 with SCOTUS.  Trump nominates Gorsuch.

Why is Kavanaugh hearing more contentious?  Probably helps GOP hold the Senate in 2018.

RBG dies, Trump nominates ACB