Here are the roles. Read the background materials carefully and give some thought to how someone in your position would advise the president.Yes, you may swap roles, but let me know when you do.
APRIL 20
1. The President — Listens, probes, and ultimately decides which approach will define their administration's foreign policy. The key challenge for this student: synthesizing competing arguments and articulate a coherent doctrine, not just pick a side. RAE RUBEN
Executive Branch — Core Foreign Policy Principals
2.INSTRUCTOR PLAYS THE National Security Advisor — Frames the debate, manages the discussion, and keeps the conversation anchored to the question of long-term U.S. interests rather than any single crisis. The institutional memory role.
3. Secretary of State — The natural voice for multilateralism: treaties, alliances, international institutions, and diplomacy are the State Department's entire reason for existing. Should make the case that U.S. legitimacy and leverage depend on working through coalitions. IBUKUN OWOLABI
4. Secretary of Defense — More ambivalent than most expect. The Pentagon values reliable allies (burden-sharing, basing rights, interoperability) but also chafes at coalition warfare's constraints. This role should articulate the military's nuanced view rather than defaulting to hawkishness. PEILIN SWAN
5. Director of National Intelligence — Brings the intelligence community's perspective: unilateralism is sometimes necessary when sharing intelligence with allies would compromise sources and methods, but multilateral intelligence-sharing has also been indispensable (Five Eyes, etc.). GEORGIA ARNOLD
6. Secretary of the Treasury — Makes the economic case: dollar hegemony, sanctions coalitions, trade agreements, and the IMF/World Bank system all depend on multilateral legitimacy. Unilateral sanctions are less effective when allies don't participate. LUKE YOUNG
7. U.S. Trade Representative — Focuses on trade architecture specifically: are bilateral deals (a more unilateral approach) or multilateral frameworks like the WTO better for American interests? Connects foreign policy doctrine to economic policy in a way other roles don't. KIMBERLY RODRUGUEZ
Executive Branch — Domestic Institutional Voices
8. White House Chief of Staff — The political realist in the room. What will the American public support? What can survive Congress? Unilateralism often polls better domestically; multilateralism is harder to sell when it requires sharing credit or accepting constraints. CHLOE FONG
9. Attorney General — Addresses the legal architecture: international treaties and multilateral commitments are binding law under the Supremacy Clause; unilateralism can mean acting outside treaty frameworks, which raises constitutional questions the president must weigh. CLARE A'HEARN
10. Director of the Office of Management and Budget — Makes the fiscal argument: multilateral burden-sharing reduces the cost of global leadership. Unilateralism means the U.S. pays the full bill. In an era of deficit pressure, this is not a trivial point. SCOTT SLOOP
Congressional Voices
11. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chair (president's party) — Reminds the president that multilateral treaties require Senate ratification (two-thirds), while executive agreements do not. The choice of doctrine has direct implications for what the president can do without Congress. HARRISON STECK
12. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Ranking Member (opposition party) — Likely to argue the opposite of whatever the chair argues, surfacing the partisan dimension of the multilateralism debate that has defined American foreign policy since Wilson. ZOE MUI
13. House Armed Services Committee Chair — Focuses on the defense authorization and appropriations implications: multilateral operations require different force structures and funding than unilateral power projection. CHRIS KAUFHOLD
Outside Perspectives (advisors invited to the meeting)
14. NATO Supreme Allied Commander (SACEUR) — The military's multilateralist par excellence. Makes the case that alliance interoperability, Article 5 credibility, and forward basing are irreplaceable assets that only multilateralism can sustain. STEPHANIE LI
15. U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations — Argues for the UN system's value while acknowledging its frustrations (Security Council vetoes, etc.). The role that best captures why multilateralism is both necessary and maddening. PETER CHEN
16. National Economic Council Director — Brings the domestic economy into the debate: global supply chains, foreign investment, and dollar dominance all depend on the rules-based international order that multilateralism built and sustains. DYLAN GONZALEZ
17. Historian/Senior Scholar (Council on Foreign Relations or similar) — A distinctive role that fits a CMC presidency course especially well: this student draws on the full semester's readings — Washington's Farewell Address, the Monroe Doctrine, TR vs. Wilson, FDR — to contextualize the choice historically. What have past presidents actually chosen, and what were the consequences?
RACHEL SVOYSKIY
18. American Public Advocate (domestic political advisor) — Represents public opinion and electoral politics. Polls consistently show Americans want burden-sharing but resist international constraints on sovereignty. This role forces the room to confront the gap between elite multilateralist consensus and the public's more ambivalent instincts — one of the central tensions the course explores when asking what it takes to win and keep the presidency JADEN ANDREWS
APRIL 22
The President HARRISON STECK
INSTRUCTOR PLAYS National Security Advisor — Facilitates the discussion and manages the clock; synthesizes options and guides the president toward a decision without pushing their own agenda.
Vice President — Political and constitutional backstop; advises on domestic public opinion and congressional dynamics around a war with China. JADEN ANDREWS
Secretary of State — Manages U.S. alliances (Japan, South Korea, Australia, Philippines) and diplomatic off-ramps; central voice on whether to negotiate or confront. DYLAN GONZALEZ
Secretary of Defense — Principal defense policy advisor; assesses the feasibility and risks of military options, from naval deployments to full intervention. CHRIS KAUFHOLD
Secretary of the Treasury — Advises on economic consequences of war, including financial sanctions on China and the impact on global markets and U.S. debt held by Beijing. ZOE MUI
Secretary of Energy — Addresses nuclear weapons policy and energy security, including disruption to global semiconductor and energy supply chains. CLARE A'HEARN
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff — The highest-ranking member of the U.S. military; advises the president on specific military options and the corresponding risks, benefits, and implications. Assesses what a defense of Taiwan would actually require militarily. SCOTT SLOOP
Director of National Intelligence — Presents the intelligence picture: how certain is the attack, what are China's goals, how long could Taiwan hold out? IBUKUN OWOLABI
Attorney General — Gives the president advice and opinions on the legal aspects of policies under consideration, including the War Powers Resolution, the Taiwan Relations Act, and the legal basis for military action. CHLOE FONG
Secretary of Homeland Security — Addresses domestic risks: cyberattacks on U.S. infrastructure accompanying the Taiwan invasion, port security, and protection of the U.S. defense industrial base. GEORGIA ARNOLD
U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations — Outlines policy steps available to the United States at the UN and advises NSC participants on what the Security Council can and cannot do — including the reality that China holds a veto. PEILIN SWAN
Director of the CIA — Provides covert options and deep intelligence on Chinese leadership intentions, PLA capabilities, and Taiwan's political will to resist. KIMBERLY RODRIGUEZ
White House Chief of Staff — Manages the domestic political dimension: congressional authorization, public opinion, and the president's political survival. STEPHANIE LI
U.S. Trade Representative — Advises on trade war escalation with China, tariffs, export controls on semiconductors, and the economic interdependence that complicates a military response. LUKE YOUNG
NSC Indo-Pacific Coordinator — Specialist role focused on U.S. alliances in the region — whether Japan and South Korea will grant basing rights, and how AUKUS and the Quad factor in. PETER CHEN
Secretary of Commerce — Addresses the TSMC/semiconductor crisis: Taiwan produces the majority of the world's advanced chips, and a Chinese takeover would be a strategic catastrophe. RAE RUBEN
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy — Provides the granular strategic options — from positioning carrier groups to a full Article 5-style commitment — and the second- and third-order consequences of each. RA CHEL SVOYSKIY
