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During the semester, I shall post course material and students will comment on it. Students are also free to comment on any aspect of the presidency, either current or historical. There are only two major limitations: no coarse language, and no derogatory comments about people at the Claremont Colleges.

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Sunday, April 12, 2026

Foreign Policy and National Security I

Today, constitutional provisions and institutional stucture.

Wednesday, the "how" and "why" of policy. Read Office of the President, "National Security Strategy of the United States," November 2025, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf

Next week's simulations:
Congressional war powers (Article I, sec. 8)

  • To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations;
  • To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water;
  • To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years;
  • To provide and maintain a Navy;
  • To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces;

Presidential War Power  (Article II, sec. 2)

  •  The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States

Tipping the balance:

  • “Frequent war and constant apprehension, which require a state of as constant preparation, will infallibly produce [standing armies]. It is of the nature of war to increase the executive at the expense of the legislative authority.” -- Alexander Hamilton, Federalist 8.
  • "If the Union’s existence were constantly menaced, and if its great interests were continually interwoven with those of other powerful nations, one would see the prestige of the executive growing, because of what was expected from it and of what it did."-- Tocqueville, Democracy in America
  • Notable deployments -- most without a declaration of war (Edwards,479)
  • The Cold War, Korea, and Vietnam
  • War Powers Act (Edwards, 480-481)

The Constitution and Diplomacy:
  •  "He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls... Article II, sec. 2).
  • "[He] shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers" (Article II, sec. 3).
Treaties, Agreements, and Trade
Key jobs

Actual powers and duties depend in part on the president.


The roles of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Combatant Commands.

Today, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have no executive authority to command combatant forces. The issue of executive authority was clearly resolved by the Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act of 1986: "The Secretaries of the Military Departments shall assign all forces under their jurisdiction to unified and specified combatant commands to perform missions assigned to those commands..."; the chain of command "runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense; and from the Secretary of Defense to the commander of the combatant command."

Mini-Simulation on April 22

On Monday and Wednesday of next week (April 20 and 22), we will do mini-simulations about presidential decisions and foreign policy.  You will not have to write a paper, but each of you will prepare for a different role in each mini-simulation. 

See general description here.

The second simulation will be a threat to Taiwan.

Preparing for your role

Before this Wednesday's class, let me know if you have a preferred role in either or both simulations.  If more than one student wants the same role in the same simulation, I will choose by lot, using a random-number generator. If you do NOT want a particular role, also let me know.  Selection for the remaining roles will be by lot, but nobody will play the same role twice.

Roles:

  • The President
  • INSTRUCTOR PLAYS National Security Advisor — Facilitates the discussion and manages the clock; synthesizes options and guides the president toward a decision without pushing their own agenda.
  • Vice President — Political and constitutional backstop; advises on domestic public opinion and congressional dynamics around a war with China.
  • Secretary of State — Manages U.S. alliances (Japan, South Korea, Australia, Philippines) and diplomatic off-ramps; central voice on whether to negotiate or confront.
  • Secretary of Defense — Principal defense policy advisor; assesses the feasibility and risks of military options, from naval deployments to full intervention.
  • Secretary of the Treasury — Advises on economic consequences of war, including financial sanctions on China and the impact on global markets and U.S. debt held by Beijing.
  • Secretary of Energy — Addresses nuclear weapons policy and energy security, including disruption to global semiconductor and energy supply chains.
  • Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff — The highest-ranking member of the U.S. military; advises the president on specific military options and the corresponding risks, benefits, and implications. Assesses what a defense of Taiwan would actually require militarily.
  • Director of National Intelligence — Presents the intelligence picture: how certain is the attack, what are China's goals, how long could Taiwan hold out?
  • Attorney General — Gives the president advice and opinions on the legal aspects of policies under consideration, including the War Powers Resolution, the Taiwan Relations Act, and the legal basis for military action.
  • Secretary of Homeland Security — Addresses domestic risks: cyberattacks on U.S. infrastructure accompanying the Taiwan invasion, port security, and protection of the U.S. defense industrial base.
  • U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations — Outlines policy steps available to the United States at the UN and advises NSC participants on what the Security Council can and cannot do  — including the reality that China holds a veto.
  • Director of the CIA — Provides covert options and deep intelligence on Chinese leadership intentions, PLA capabilities, and Taiwan's political will to resist.
  • White House Chief of Staff — Manages the domestic political dimension: congressional authorization, public opinion, and the president's political survival.
  • U.S. Trade Representative — Advises on trade war escalation with China, tariffs, export controls on semiconductors, and the economic interdependence that complicates a military response.
  • NSC Indo-Pacific Coordinator — Specialist role focused on U.S. alliances in the region — whether Japan and South Korea will grant basing rights, and how AUKUS and the Quad factor in.
  • Secretary of Commerce — Addresses the TSMC/semiconductor crisis: Taiwan produces the majority of the world's advanced chips, and a Chinese takeover would be a strategic catastrophe.
  • Under Secretary of Defense for Policy — Provides the granular strategic options — from positioning carrier groups to a full Article 5-style commitment — and the second- and third-order consequences of each.


Mini-Simulation on April 20

On Monday and Wednesday of next week (April 20 and 22), we will do mini-simulations about presidential decisions and foreign policy. You will not have to write a paper, but each of you will prepare for a different role in each mini-simulation.

See general description here (click instructions, role & goals, and how-to video).

The first simulation will be a choice between multilateralism and unilateralism.   (Take another look at this Wednesday's reading, the National Security Strategy)

Preparing for your role

Before this Wednesday's class, let me know if you have a preferred role in either or both simulations.  If more than one student wants the same role in the same simulation, I will choose by lot, using a random-number generator. If you do NOT want a particular role, also let me know.  Selection for the remaining roles will be by lot, but nobody will play the same role twice.

Roles:

1. The President — Listens, probes, and ultimately decides which approach will define their administration's foreign policy. The key challenge for this student: synthesizing competing arguments and articulate a coherent doctrine, not just pick a side. 


Executive Branch — Core Foreign Policy Principals

2.INSTRUCTOR PLAYS THE National Security Advisor — Frames the debate, manages the discussion, and keeps the conversation anchored to the question of long-term U.S. interests rather than any single crisis. The institutional memory role.

3. Secretary of State — The natural voice for multilateralism: treaties, alliances, international institutions, and diplomacy are the State Department's entire reason for existing. Should make the case that U.S. legitimacy and leverage depend on working through coalitions.

4. Secretary of Defense — More ambivalent than most expect. The Pentagon values reliable allies (burden-sharing, basing rights, interoperability) but also chafes at coalition warfare's constraints. This role should articulate the military's nuanced view rather than defaulting to hawkishness.

5. Director of National Intelligence — Brings the intelligence community's perspective: unilateralism is sometimes necessary when sharing intelligence with allies would compromise sources and methods, but multilateral intelligence-sharing has also been indispensable (Five Eyes, etc.).

6. Secretary of the Treasury — Makes the economic case: dollar hegemony, sanctions coalitions, trade agreements, and the IMF/World Bank system all depend on multilateral legitimacy. Unilateral sanctions are less effective when allies don't participate.

7. U.S. Trade Representative — Focuses on trade architecture specifically: are bilateral deals (a more unilateral approach) or multilateral frameworks like the WTO better for American interests? Connects foreign policy doctrine to economic policy in a way other roles don't.


Executive Branch — Domestic Institutional Voices

8. White House Chief of Staff — The political realist in the room. What will the American public support? What can survive Congress? Unilateralism often polls better domestically; multilateralism is harder to sell when it requires sharing credit or accepting constraints.

9. Attorney General — Addresses the legal architecture: international treaties and multilateral commitments are binding law under the Supremacy Clause; unilateralism can mean acting outside treaty frameworks, which raises constitutional questions the president must weigh.

10. Director of the Office of Management and Budget — Makes the fiscal argument: multilateral burden-sharing reduces the cost of global leadership. Unilateralism means the U.S. pays the full bill. In an era of deficit pressure, this is not a trivial point.


Congressional Voices 

11. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chair (president's party) — Reminds the president that multilateral treaties require Senate ratification (two-thirds), while executive agreements do not. The choice of doctrine has direct implications for what the president can do without Congress.

12. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Ranking Member (opposition party) — Likely to argue the opposite of whatever the chair argues, surfacing the partisan dimension of the multilateralism debate that has defined American foreign policy since Wilson.

13. House Armed Services Committee Chair — Focuses on the defense authorization and appropriations implications: multilateral operations require different force structures and funding than unilateral power projection.


Outside Perspectives (advisors invited to the meeting)

14. NATO Supreme Allied Commander (SACEUR) — The military's multilateralist par excellence. Makes the case that alliance interoperability, Article 5 credibility, and forward basing are irreplaceable assets that only multilateralism can sustain.

15. U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations — Argues for the UN system's value while acknowledging its frustrations (Security Council vetoes, etc.). The role that best captures why multilateralism is both necessary and maddening.

16. National Economic Council Director — Brings the domestic economy into the debate: global supply chains, foreign investment, and dollar dominance all depend on the rules-based international order that multilateralism built and sustains.

17. Historian/Senior Scholar (Council on Foreign Relations or similar) — A distinctive role that fits a CMC presidency course especially well: this student draws on the full semester's readings — Washington's Farewell Address, the Monroe Doctrine, TR vs. Wilson, FDR — to contextualize the choice historically. What have past presidents actually chosen, and what were the consequences?

18. American Public Advocate (domestic political advisor) — Represents public opinion and electoral politics. Polls consistently show Americans want burden-sharing but resist international constraints on sovereignty. This role forces the room to confront the gap between elite multilateralist consensus and the public's more ambivalent instincts — one of the central tensions the course explores when asking what it takes to win and keep the presidency. t